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We test how keiretsu membership affects the Fama and French (1999)  required IRR on value 
(or  cost  of  capital)  and the IRR on  cost  (or return on investment),  1974-95,  of all  listed 
non-financials  in  Japan.  Rather than computing point estimates from  aggregate data, we 
employ non-linear cross-sectional regression analysis of individual-firm data and we control for 
industry and .size  factors in returns.  We find that firms  have added value-and significantly 
so-regardless of industry, size,  and governance system.  In terms of cost of capital, we find 
no evidence of a keiretsu advantage.  In fact, within the segment of medium- and small-sized 
firms  the keiretsu ones often have the higher expected return on value.  In terms of return 
on investment, mid- and low-cap firms show no  clear difference but top-league keiretsu firms 
notched up definitely lower numbers than did comparable non-keiretsu ones.  Our interpretation 
is that keiretsu groups have cross-subsidized their larger member firms, a strategy that led the 
latter to over-invest. Introduction 
Keiretsu Membership, Size, 
and Returns on Value and Cost 
An important issue in corporate finance is how firms perform under different systems of cor-
porate governance and financing,  and whether one governance system stands out as superior. 
Under the Anglo-American system, firms tend to be shareholder-value oriented, being financed 
and disciplined at arm's length by the capital market. Some other countries, and most promi-
nently so Germany and Japan during the post-war period, traditionally give other stakeholders 
much more influence; and financing and controlling is done by banks and large industrial share-
holders, often in a much more hands-on way and, some claim(ed), with a longer-run perspective 
than what is  standard in a stockmarket-driven system.  For example, Japan, long one of the 
world's fastest growers and still the country with the second most valuable stock market, has 
a keiretsu system in which reciprocal holdings among business firms  and between industrials 
and their main bank enable financing  and disciplining within the group.l  There has been 
much division in the literature, both theoretical and empirical, as to how keiretsu membership 
affects corporate performance in general and the cost of capital in particular. In this paper, we 
shed new empirical light on the issue and exploit the fact that corporate governance in Japan 
is  far  from homogeneous.  Specifically,  next to the keiretsu groups, there are many Japanese 
firms  with a much more Anglo-Saxon governance concept.  This allows  us to study the issue 
empirically without introducing a host of inter-national noise factors. 
Unlike previous studies in this field,  reviewed below,  we  gauge corporate health by both 
the cost of capital and the corporate return on investment.  Both are measured  as  internal 
rates of return  (IRRs)  over  a  long  period and covering  a wide  set of firms-in fact,  all  of 
Japan's listed non-financials,  over  22  years,  1974 to 1995.  This use  of long-period, market-
wide IRRs has been pioneered by Fama and French (1999).  However, rather than just providing 
point estimates from highly aggregated data, our approach is to estimate IRRs by non-linear 
'See Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, for a survey of corporate governance around the world.  Nakatani, 1984, and 
Gerlach, 1992, offer reviews of the keiretsu groups, and Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard, 1994, of Japan's main-bank 
system.  Porter,  1992,  and Jacobs,  1993,  raise economic-policy concerns about the alleged lack  of long-term 
perspective among American corporations Keiretsu membership, size, and returns  2 
regression on suitable rescaled individual-firm data. This procedure allows us to (i) better use 
the information from small firms,  (ii) assess the significance of any observed return differences, 
and (iii) control for  both size  and industry effects  in returns.  Taking into account size and 
industry is crucial-not only because the keiretsu/non-keiretsu distribution is far from neutral 
in those respects, but also because it helps interpretating the findings.  Especially the analysis 
of size  effects  allows  us to weed  out many of the possible propositions  about how  keiretsu 
membership affects cost of capital and return on investment. 
Our empirical findings are as follows.  First, against the traditional view on the advantages 
of a  main-bank-centered system, we  find no evidence that keiretsu firms  enjoyed a lower re-
quired return on value than did comparable non-keiretsu ones.  To the contrary, for  medium-
an small-sized firms the evidence actually is that, taking into account size and industry, the 
required return on value was actually higher within the keiretsu subsample.  Second, we find 
that top-league  keiretsu firms  experienced definitely poorer returns on investment than did 
comparable non-keiretsu ones.  Third, the resulting effect  of keiretsu membership on Value 
Added is  unclear for medium- and small-sized ones, but significantly negative for  large firms. 
The most likely joint explanation of these findings is that smaller members of a keiretsu group 
tend(  ed) to be milked so as to cross-subsidize the larger firms within the cluster; that this cross-
subsidizing was mostly done through banking channels rather than regular transfer pricing; 
and that it led to overinvestment and poor returns among the groups' large firms. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways.  First,  our measures of health 
improve on those used before.  Unlike the accounting profits used in many studies, our IRRs 
are over a long period and, via the terminal value, also embody expectations about the post-
sample period.  And the FF (1999)  return on value avoids many of the theoretical restrictions 
and practical problems associated with the Weighted Average of Costs of Capital.  Second, 
we  demonstrate that although many return differences can be traced to industry and size,  a 
keiretsu-membership effect is  still significant in many cases.  Third, while we find that many 
extant results  appear to be robust with respect to how  one  measures  corporate health, we 
stress the heterogeneities across the size spectrum.  For instance, while Weinstein and Yafeh 
(1998) already show that keiretsu firms had a higher cost of capital than did non-keiretsu firms, 
we point out that this is valid for smaller firms only.  Their finding that keiretsu firms showed 
lower profitability (see  also  Nakatani, 1984) is  qualified in a similar way:  only large keiretsu 
firms  turn out to provide significantly lower  returns on investment than large non-keiretsu 
firms.  Also, we  can identify the large keiretsu firms as the segment that suffers from the soft-Keiretsu membership, size, and returns  3 
budget-constraint problem, viz.  persistence with unprofitable projects, that Dewatripont and 
Maskin (1995)  predict in less arm's-length and more centralized credit markets like Japan's. 
Lastly, we  do find that one segment, the smallest keiretsu firms, does seem to have flourished 
in its investments despite its high cost of capital. 
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 1 reviews the literature. In Section 2, we present 
our basic methodological choices and provide the details of our regression-based estimator of 
the Fama and French (1999) IRR yardsticks. Section 3 describes the data and discusses some 
qualitative characteristics of the sample and subsamples.  Statistical results are proffered and 
interpreted in Section 4.  Section 5 concludes. 
1  Conflicting views on the Keiretsu system 
1.1  The Literature 
The success  of Japans economy during most of the postwar period has greatly stimulated 
academic interest in the merits of its system, and many authors have related this success to 
Japan's distinct main-bank tradition. To avoid confusion, we start with a few definitions.  One 
concept is relationship banking, i.e.  having a long-standing tradition of doing a lot of financial 
business with a bank, which therefore gets to know the company well.  A main-bank-centered 
system, in contrast, goes beyond relationship banking in the sense that it is,  in Aoki et al.'s 
(1994) well-chosen words, "multifaceted": the bank is at the center of a conglomerate cluster of 
firms, and the intra-group links go beyond simple relationship banking (see below). A keiretsu? 
in its most general sense, is a cluster of firms.  There are hundreds of these in Japan. Some of 
them are "vertical" ones, that is, a swarm of suppliers linked to a central manufacturer such as 
Toyota.  Its members typically do relationship banking but their bank is not the center of the 
group, and needs not even be the same across each and every industrial member. The second, 
best-known and most traditional type of keiretsu is called "financial" or "horizontal", because 
they are main-bank-centered and diversified across industries.  Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, 
and Puyo are the successors to the pre-war zaibatsu, i.e.  the holding companies of the type one 
also sees in many European countries, with (de  facto)  controlling stakes in at least one bank 
and in many industrial companies, sometimes via sub-holding companies. When the zaibatsu 
holding companies were broken up, their role in corporate-governance and finance was handed 
2See Gerlach, 1992, for  a comprehensive anatomy of the keiretsu groupings Keiretsu membership, size, and returns  4 
on to the group's bank;  and their equity stakes in subsidiaries were transformed into cross 
holdings among members. 
In this paper,  the term "keiretsu"  is  used  in the narrow sense only,  that is,  the finan-
cial/horizontal type. Thus, like many researchers before us-for example Hoshi, Kashyap, and 
Scharfstein (1990a,b, 1991);  Prowse (1990,1992);  Weinstein and Yafeh  (1998);  Dewenter and 
Warther, (1998)-we equate main-bank-centered relationships with keiretsu membership.  We 
distinguish it from relationship banking-which, as Aoki,  Patrick, and Sheard (1994)  argue, 
virtually every Japanese firm has adopted.  One has to realise that, since relationship banking 
is  wide-spread, most firms  may already benefit from the potentially lower  monitoring costs 
and asymmetric-information costs associated with a house-bank relation.  However, regarding 
finance and governance, keiretsu membership has implications that go  beyond relationship-
banking.  First, there are financial channels other than through the main bank.  For example, 
whenever this is in the interest of the group as a whole, cash can also be redistributed among 
members  via cross-participations and dividends,  or via transfer pricing.  In the same vain, 
financing of especially the smaller firms can be facilitated by the group's soga sosha (trading 
firm-a reinvoicing center, really), which essentially acts as central counterparty for all internal 
and external trade contracts (Miyashita and Russell, 1994).  This way,  the soga sosha fulfills 
some of the traditional banking functions:  diversifying credit risks and reducing information 
asymmetries.  Last,  cemented with cross-holding, financial keiretsu main-banks usually send 
their own directors and auditors to sit on the board of member firms.  This close monitoring 
may allow keiretsu main banks to achieve much more, re corporate governance, than a regular 
relationship bank.3 
There is  an important strand in the literature that views the keiretsu system as  one of 
the explanations of Japan's rebirth after 1945.  For example, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein 
(1990a,b,  1991)  find that, thanks to their close relationships with the main banks, Japanese 
firms  have  been less  constrained by their internal  cash position,  allowing  them to continue 
their investments and growth even facing a shortage of cash.  Comparing firms  from  Japan 
and the U.S.  (whose governance system is  a natural rival to Japan's), Prowse  (1990)  finds 
that reciprocal holdings among Japan's firms and banks greatly mitigate the agency problems 
between shareholders and debtholders.  Kaplan and Minton (1994)  and Kang and Shivdasani 
30ne example of action that goes beyond relationship banking is the rescuing of financially distressed firms. 
Sheard (1994)  lists 42  rescue cases for the past 30 years, and finds  that almost all of them occur in financial-
keiretsu groups.  This highlights the governance function of Japanese main-bank system. Keiretsu membership, size, and returns  5 
(1997) likewise confirm the positive role of a main bank in helping firms in financial difficulties. 
In a theoretical study, Berglof and Perotti (1994)  further argue that the cross holdings in the 
keiretsu governance structure makes internal discipline more sustainable over time.  Shleifer 
and  Summer  (1988)  point out another advantage  of  a  governance  structure that can fend 
off hostile takeovers.  Any hostile takeove breaks up valuable  (long-term) implicit contracts. 
Thus, a  corporate governance mechanism that is resistant to hostile takeovers adds value in 
an  economy where such implicit  contracts are  usueful.  Also,  the keiretsu  bank,  being less 
dependent on external  funding  and  benefiting from  implicit  co-insurance  from  other firms 
within the group, is often able to extend loans at conditions that would have been impossible 
in more arm's-length contracts.  In short, in terms of cost of capital and operating efficiency, 
keiretsu members may reap benefits that go  beyond what is  within available,  through pure 
relationship banking, to non-keiretsu firms.  On the other hand, the keiretsu's potential for 
cross-subsidizing could also mean that investment projects may be undertaken that would not 
have passed a more arm's-length test (see Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995). 
This has brought us to the contra side of the debate. In view of the Japan's economic slump 
and persistently depressed stock market in the 1990s, the more recent literature has naturally 
become more critical towards the country's governance system (see Allen, 1996, for a review on 
this reversal of opinions).  Kang and Stulz (1995)  document that, during the 1990-93 Japanese 
stock-market  slump,  firms  whose  bank debt  represent  a  larger fraction of their total debt 
invested less and produced significantly lower stock returns.4  Moreover, Weinstein and Yafeh 
(1998) find that, for  1977-86, main-bank firms exhibit lower profitability and growth as well as 
a higher cost of capital relative to unaffiliated firms.  As this was before the stockmarket slump 
and the ensuing  credit  crunch,  liquidity constraints with the banks themselves  are not the 
likely explanation.  Rather, Weinstein and Yafeh (1998)  interpret their findings as consistent 
with the hypothesis  of  rent-extracting or holdup behavior  by  banks that have  information 
monopolies on client firms  (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1991; and Houston and James, 1996).  Also, 
the monitoring role of the main banks seems to have been quite narrow in focus.  Morck and 
Nakamura (1998)  show that, for  1981-87, banker appointments in a firm's board of directors 
more often took place in response to poor concurrent liquidity, and less as a reaction to lagging 
4Kang and Stulz  (1998)  highlight the impact of the whole banking sector instead of the influence  of the 
main-bank  relationship  on  the Japanese  firms  during the economic slum  and  credit  crunch.  However,  in  the 
context of Japan, since the main-bank affiliated firms usually take more bank loans, they interpret their findings 
as an adverse effect of bank-centered corporate governance. Keiretsu membership, size, and returns  6 
share values.  Moreover, Morek and Nakamura (1999) argue that Japanese governance practices 
did not assign effective control rights to residual claimants, as governance power was too much 
in the hands of banks rather than shareholders.  Consistent with this view, Morek, Nakamura, 
and Shivdasani (1999) find  that there is  a negative relationship between bank ownership and 
firm value,  provided that bank ownership is large enough to affect corporate governance but 
not so large as to align bank interests with those of shareholders. 
Yet, the recent outcry against the main-bank system is by no means unanimous.  Anderson 
and Makhija (1999) observe that, as one would expect, public-debt-constrained Japanese firms 
took on  relatively more bank debt in 1985-89.  But when the restrictions on  placement of 
public  debt were lifted,  in 1990,  these firms continued to take on more bank debt without 
adverse effects on growth.  Anderson and Makhija conclude that, for firms where arm's-length 
debt would imply high agency costs, banks do provide monitoring benefits and do not impose 
meaningful holdUp cost. This is in sharp contrast to the findings by Houston and James (1996) 
for U.S. firms.  And while Gibson (1995) finds that, in 1991-92, some banks in Japan did harm 
their client firms  by hindering investment, such behavior seemed to be restricted to "weak" 
(and mostly small) banks.  Thus, Gibson concludes that problems in the banking sector had 
no major impact on the Japanese economy. 
1.2  Competing hypotheses 
Thus,  from  the literature the picture is by  no means  clear,  whether one takes a theoretical 
or an empirical perspective.  Table 1 summarizes the a priori arguments.  In terms of cost of 
capital (or expected return on value, in Fama and French (1999)'s terminology), main-bank-
oriented firms  may benefit from  lower  monitoring and agency costs, as we  saw;  and, to the 
extent that these firms  are part of a  keiretsu group,  co-insurance would  further lower the 
financial-distress-related costs.  But others argue that relationship banking could actually raise 
a firm's  cost  capital,  notably because of hold-up  behavior by main banks.  If,  as empirical 
work suggests, such behavior already occurs in the U.S., then it could become even more likely 
when,  as within a keiretsu, the house bank is supported by the firm's main shareholders, or 
when  rent-extraction is  part of a socially accepted cross-subsidization program rather than 
something to be done more or less on the sly. 
The ambiguity of the predictions is  even larger when we also consider the likely keiretsu-
impact on return on investment (or return on cost), Fama and French (1999)'s second measure Keiretsu membership, size, and returns  7 
Table 1:  Potential Explanations for differential returns 
Factors that may increase a firm's cost of capital 
factor-general  size-related comments  governance-related  com-
ments 
•  asymmetric  information  and  •  more  information  asy=e- •  Most firms,  K  or not, have a 
adverse selection leads to ex- tries for smaller firms-unless  house bank 
cessive  risk  spreads  on  bor- resolved by relationship bank- • but K-firms  links  go  far  be-
rowing  ing without ripoff  yond relationship-banking 
•  banks  rip  off customers that  •  banks'  hold-up  behavior,  if  •  hold-up  behavior  towards 
are,  or have  become,  depen- any,  is  more  likely  towards  some  firms  may  even  be  an 
dent on them  small  firms  that have  (fewer  explicit and accepted part of 
or)  no alternatives  K-group's  cross-subsidization 
policy 
•  a narrow income base and/or  •  default  risk  is  especially  a  •  co-insurance within K groups 
a volatile cashflow worsen de- problem for  smaller (undiver- may allow smaller members to 
fault risk  sified) firms  reduce default risk 
Factors that may decrease a firm's return on investment 
factor-general  size-related aspects  governance-related aspects 
•  low  revenues:  lower  market  •  lack of market power is  more  •  transfer  pricing  may  be  an 
power and more competition,  likely for small firms  explicit and accepted part of 
or transfer pricing  K-graup's  cross-subsidization 
policy 
•  EITHER {heterogenous  firms,  •  (see size-related determinants  •  (see governance-related deter-
dynamic  environment: )  high  of cost of capital)  minants of cost of capital) 
cost  of  capital  or  liquidity  •  liquidity  constraints  more 
constraints preventing exploita- likely  for  smaller  firms-
tion of windfall opportunities or  unless  small  firms'  problems 
niches, lowering profitability  resolved  by  relationship 
•  OR  (homogenous  firms  except  banking without ripoff 
for  size;  static neoclassical  set-
ting:)  lower  cost  of  capital  or 
absence  of  liquidity  constraints 
leading to more investment, de-
creasing return on investment 
•  poor  management,  implying  •  better  monitoring  may  im-
little or no competitive advan- prove performance 
tage  •  in K firms,  poor management 
is less likely to be weeded out 
•  smaller  K  firms  may  even 
serve as  dumping ground for 
redundant  staff  from  larger 
member firms 
•  stakeholders,  esp.  employees  •  union power or political pres- •  opportunities  for  cross-
and politicians, press for over- sure  tends  to  be  larger  in  subsidized overinvestment are 
investment  larger firms  especially present for larger K 
members. Keiretsu membership, size, and returns  8 
of corporate health.  The predictions about how keiretsu membership may affect  return on 
investment  very much  depend on one's views  on what the main determinant  of corporate 
profitability is.  The most intuitive view probably is that, even within industries, firms are quite 
heterogeneous, and thrive on competitive advantage and entrepreneurial ability in exploiting 
windfall opportunities. But the firm's ability to respond quickly may be hampered by capital 
constraints, themselves due to e.g.  incentive and information asymmetries (see,  for  instance, 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers and Majluf, 1984). In this view, if  keiretsu groups internalise 
the capital markets and its member firms have swifter and ampler access to capital, they should 
be more profitable.  At the negative end of the spectrum, if keiretsu membership leads to cross-
subsidization and overinvestment, then the IRR on cost is low.  In short, in this view,  (i)  the 
return on investment reflects management's ability to spot and implement (only) good projects; 
(ii) the higher this return, the better; and (iii) opinions are divided as to which way keiretsu 
membership affects the quality of investments. 
Neoclassical industrial economists, however,  would think different.  Under the traditional 
"structure-conduct-performance"  paradigm, firms  within an industry are viewed as substan-
tially homogenous (apart from, possibly, size); returns from investment are decreasing (at least 
around the optimum); and unconstrained value maximization, if  feasible, equates marginal re-
turn on capital to marginal cost.  The implication of that line of reasoning is that the (hard-to-
predict) effect of keiretsu membership on the cost of capital will affect the return on investment 
in the same direction.  Thus, (i) the return on investment does not necessarily say a lot that is 
not yet contained in the cost of capital, (ii) it therefore is neither good nor bad in itself, and 
(iii) if opinions are divided as to how keiretsu membership influences the cost of capital, then 
so they are on how return on investment is affected. 
Yet another view arises if capital constraints (see  above)  are analysed from this standard 
neoclassical  angle rather than from  the competitive-advantage  perspective.  Any  such con-
straints would generally prevent firms from equating marginal cost and return.  If,  as before, 
keiretsu membership helps solving this problem, then keiretsu members would typically invest 
more.  Given decreasing returns to scale, this implies that their returns on investment are lower 
rather than higher.  In short, under this third view (i) a high return on investment reflects a 
funding problem; (ii) in that sense, it is bad rather than good;  and (ii) keiretsu firms would 
have lower IRRs on cost if the internalized capital market solves the liquidity problems. 
In view  of the ambiguity of the theoretical predictions,  the purpose of our paper is  to 
empirically compare a system with shareholder-value orientation and arm's-length financing Keiretsu membership, size, and returns  9 
to a rival system where other stakeholders have more influence and where control and financing 
are much more internalized.  To that end we study both the gross profitability (that is, return on 
the cost of corporate investment) and the required return on market value (or cost of capital), 
for firms with different governance structures but similar size and industry characteristics. In 
the next section we  describe in more detail how we  approach the issue. 
2  Test Methodology 
We start with a  discussion of the basic requirements we  want  to meet  in this article,  and 
continue with the practical research design. 
2.1  Fundamental Research Choices 
The lack of consensus  about the pros and cons of the Japanese main-bank system and the 
mixed empirical results call for an examination that (i) controls for the non-governance-related 
aspects of performance, (ii)  is  comprehensive,  (iii)  is  based on a robust measure of corporate 
health, and (iv)  allows significance tests. We start our discussion with non governance-related 
aspects of performance-specifically:  size and industry, and country-specific factors. 
To study the costs and benefits of corporate-governance structures, one could have con-
trasted the performance of,  say,  U.S.  and  Japanese or German firms.  Obviously,  however, 
such a  comparison would have brought in a host of other determinants of performance other 
than corporate governance, such as the possible effects of capital market segmentation on the 
required return on value, as well  as differences in accounting and tax rules and other institu-
tional factors (see e.g.  Rajan and Zingales,  1995, and La Porta et al.,  1999).  To  avoid such 
cross-country differences, we have chosen to compare two classes of firms from one single coun-
try, Japan.  Prewse  (1992),  among others, stresses that the non-keiretsu segment of Japan's 
economy is  much closer to the Anglo-American tradition, with firms  much more subject to 
the capital market discipline.  The presence, within one country, of large populations of firms 
subject to distinct governance systems provides  a  better-controlled test ground for  the two 
governance systems.  Thus, for most part of our analysis in the paper we separate the Japanese 
non-financial  firms  in  two  groups,  (financial/horizontal)  keiretsu  firms-that is,  companies 
closely affiliated with the Big Six industrial groups-and non-keiretsu firms (members that are Keiretsu membership, size, and returns  10 
very weakly affiliated, or not affiliated, with the Big Six).5 
Among the other factors that may have affected the relative performance of the two groups, 
industry and size effects loom large.  Indeed, size and industry (or beta, which is  often asso-
ciated with industry) are well-known determinants of profitability and required return;  and 
keiretsu groups do tend to be under-represented in non-traditional sectors and in the lower 
end of the size distribution (see Section 3.1 for  numerical evidence).  Thus, one should surely 
take into account "main"  (additive)  size- and industry-effects in the return or cost of capi-
tal.  It should  be realized,  though, that the potential impact of keiretsu memberships may 
be confined to particular categories of firms.  For  instance, information asymmetries as  well 
as liquidity constraints (and the corresponding potential gains from  relationship banking or 
help from friendly firms) are a priori more important for smaller firms;  but then also a bank's 
potential for  rent-extraction is  larger towards weaker clients.  Likewise,  reliance on external 
financing (and, hence, the risk of liquidity constraints or the bank's scope for hold-up behav-
ior) is less important in mature industries.  For these reasons, we introduce size and industry 
not just as "main" effects but also as interactions with the governance variable.  While these 
interactions may appear to be complicating factors in our search for governance effects, it turns 
out that an analysis of size interactions, in tandem with keiretsu-membership effects,  allows 
us to empirically distinguish between the host of possible views listed in Table 1. 
Our second objective, next to ceteris-paribus testing, is comprehensiveness.  We attain this 
by considering all listed non-financial firms in Japan over a 22-year period, 1974-1995, quite 
similar to one of the time spans, 1973-96, studied by Fama and French (1999). 
Our third requirement is  a  robust analytical measure of corporate health.  Many studies 
(McCauley and Zimmer, 1989, and Frankel, 1991, and others) have used as the required re-
turn on value the traditional weighted average of cost of capital (WACC)  with various (and 
5 An alternative research  design  would  have  been to classify  firms  as  having  a  house  bank or not,  as  in 
Campbell and Hamao (1994).  They classify main-bank firms as firms that had taken up their largest outstanding 
loans from any of the 19 major Japanese banks in fiscal year 1983/4.  As a result, Campbell and Hamao identify 
77 percent of all listed Japanese non-financials as main-bank firms.  However, as argued above, keiretsu members 
are even less  dependent on external financing than are non-keiretsu firms even if the latter have a main bank, 
and keiretsu firms are also more stakeholder-oriented than non-keiretsu ones.  In addition, keiretsu membership 
is  readily  identifiable and more stable than a  Campbell-Hamao classification on the basis  of a  firm's  loans. 
Lastly,  a keiretsu/non-keiretsu classification produces more balanced groups than does the Campbell-Hamao 
classification.  Thus, we adopt the keiretsu-membership criterion as the indicator of a less capital-market-oriented 
governance system.  A reader that is  interested in main-bank relations or  not, would correctly conclude that 
our classification is noisy; however, misclassification biases against finding any differences, which makes the test 
conservative in that respect. Keiretsu membership, size, and returns  11 
sometimes rather ad hoc)  inputs,6  and their measures of corporate investment returns are 
largely accounting ratios.  The WACC  is,  however,  based on rather restrictive assumptions, 
and the required inputs are not easy to obtain. In our paper, we basically adopt an approach 
recently pioneered by Fama and French (1999)  (hereafter FF): we study the "IRR on cost of 
investment"  and the "IRR on market value", as well as the spread between the two returns, 
for keiretsu versus non-keiretsu firms.  However, we modify the original FF approach in several 
ways. 
The original FF approach is to compute IRRs on cost and on market value from aggregate 
data (initial investment, interim cash flows, and terminal value), either for the entire corporate 
sector or industry by industry.  Each such computation produces a point estimate for either the 
return on cost or the required return on value, depending in whether investments are measured 
at cost or at capital-market value.  In the present paper, this procedure is  applied only to 
compare the Japanese corporate sector  (as a  whole)  to its U.S.  counterpart.7  But such an 
estimation procedure still leaves room for improvement:  (i) each aggregate is dominated by its 
larger firms, so that the information from smaller corporations is under-used; (ii) any observed 
divergence  between these IRRs may be driven by industry and size  factors  or institutional 
differences  rather than governance-related aspects;  and  (iii)  there is  no way to gauge the 
significance of the observed differences.  Similar drawbacks apply if  we compare, within Japan, 
IRRs from aggregate keiretsu data to those from the aggregate non-keiretsu segment.  Thus, 
we use such IRRs for exploratory purposes only; for most .of the work we instead rely on IRRs 
estimated from scaled individual-firm data using non-linear regression and controlling for size 
and industry factors, as  explained in Section 2.  This way, we can also test the significance of 
differences between returns on cost and on value or between returns to keiretsu and non-keiretsu 
firms for  various size and industry combinations. 
6The methodology in Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) is markedly different from others.  Their cost of capital gap 
between keiretsu and non-keiretsu is derived from their model.  However,  their model does rely on a discount 
rate of the WACC type.  One advantage of the WACC approach is that it can correct for the interest tax-shield 
effect under Miller-ModigUani assumptions. However, the size and even the very existence of this tax shield are 
controversial.  At the very least, the WACC is likely to overstate the tax-shield effect. 
7We find  no support for the popular notion that Japan's cost of capital is lower then the U.S. one, once we 
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2.2  Specification and Estimation of IRRs on value and on cost 
By definition, the IRRs are discount rates that make the total present value of cash flows into 
and out of a project equal to zero.  FF (1999) calculate the IRRs of the U.S.  corporate sector 
by treating the entire private sector as a single investment project.  That is, the FF IRRs on 
value and cost are the discount rates, Tv and Te,  that solve, respectively, 
(2.1) 
and 
FBG =t Xt-It  tFSt-FBCt  TVT 
o  ;=1 (1 +  Te)t + i=1  (1 +  Te)t  + (1 +  Te)T' 
(2.2) 
In (2.1)  and (2.2), the variables are defined as in FF (1998): 
FBlIi  (firms bought at market value,  time t) is  the aggregate initial market value of firms 
that first enter the sample in year t; time 0 is the first year in the sample; 
FBCt (firms bought at cost, time t)  is their aggregate initial book value; 
X t is aggregate cash earnings (after-tax earnings before deduction of interest and depreciation) 
for year t for the firms that were in the sample in year t - 1; 
It is the aggregate gross investment (net investment plus depreciation) of these firms.  Bya 
standard cash-flow equation, X t -It equals the volume of current payouts (dividends, 
interest)  minus  net security issues  (equity or debt)  in year t;  that is,  Xt  - It,  when 
positive, equals the net amount paid out in year t; otherwise it measures the net amount 
raised from capital markets. 
FSt  (firms sold during year t) is the terminal market value of firms that leave the sample in 
year t  < T, where T  is the end-of-sample year; 
TVT is the aggregate terminal market value of firms that still exist at the end of the sample 
period. 
If  the IRR-on-value is  a long-term average obtained from a wide aggregate, it can be used as 
an estimate of the ex  ante required return for  the representative firm;  and the IRR-on-cost 
likewise estimates the expected return on investment or book value. 
Equations (2.1)  and (2.2)  can be  applied to any aggregate-e.g.  the keiretsu and non-
keiretsu subgroups-but such a procedure would have some limitations (see Section 2.1).  To 
cope with these problems, we work with individual-firm data rather than aggregates.  Expected Keiretsu membership, size, and returns  13 
returns are allowed to vary across firms, depending on industry (proxying for beta), size, and 
governance structure.  We  distinguish ten industries  (described in Section 3)  and five  size 
quintiles.  To  model, for  instance, the return for  a  non-keiretsu firm,  we  generate a  set of 
industry dummies Ii,j, i = 1, ... 10,  (where Ii,j is equal to 1 iff firm j  is from industry i), and 
we let ai  denote the expected return for a non-keiretsu firm of the i-th industry in the largest 
quintile, size quintile 5.  Similarly, we define S'J, s = 1, ... ,4, as a set of size dummies indicating 
membership of the s-th size quintile, and we let e. denote the expected return differential for 
quintile s relative to the largest quintile expected return on value.  Then the expected return 
on value for a non-keiretsu firm j  is the firm's industry average corrected for a size effect: 
10  4 
T",j = L  a",iliJ + L  e""S'J.  (2.3) 
i=l  8=1 
A similar equation can be written for  return on cost, TeJ: 
10  4 
T  eJ = L  ae,ili,j + L  ee,.S  .,j.  (2.4) 
i=1  .=1 
For firms that are keiretsu members we allow each of  the parameter vectors a and e to shift, by b 
and I, respectively.  Specifically, if firm j  is a keiretsu member, we set the keiretsu-membership 
dummy, K j , equal to unity instead of zero, and specify the expected returns in general as 
10  4 
r"J = L(av,i + b",iKj)IiJ + L(e",. + Iv,.Kj)S.,j.  (2.5) 
i=l  8=1 
and 
10  4 
TeJ  =  L(ae,i +  be,iKj)Ii,j + L(ee,s + Ie,.Kj)S.,j.  (2.6) 
i=l  .=1 
Note that we  let the keiretsu effect  depend on size  and industry,  as  per our discussion in 
Section 2.  Note also that size enters the equation as a set of size-class dummies, rather than 
as a cardinal number (like the log of value):  this specification does not impose a particular 
functional form on the relation between 1RR and size. 
Relative to FF, expected returns on value or on cost are now constrained to be equal across 
firms  with similar characteristics,  implying that the  individual-firm  returns can no  longer 
perfectly fit  a given firm's individual cash-flow pattern. Thus, the value equation for each firm 
needs to be expanded with an error term that captures the firm's idiosyncratic factor: 
N(j) 
FBV.  .  _  '"  Xj,t - Ij,t +  TVj,N(j) 
J,n(j) - L..  (1 +  T  -)t  (1 +  T  .)N(j) +  €v,j, 
t=n(j)+ 1  v,J  v,J 
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and 
N(') 
_  ~ Xj,t - Ij,t  TVj,N(j) 
F BCj,n(j) - L..J  (1 +  r  .)t + (1 + r  .)N(j) + Ee,j' 
t=n(j)+l  e,J  e,J 
(2.8) 
In these equations, n(j) is the starting year for  firm j  (0  if the firm  was  already listed in 
1974,  or the number of years to go  to its first  listing if not),  and N(j) its end year  (21  if 
the firm  was  still listed in 1995;  if not,  the number of year between 1974 and the year of 
j's delisting).  Lastly,  to reduce the dominance of large firms-or,  in statistical terms, the 
size-related heteroscedasticity in the residuals of (2.7) or (2.8)-we divide through the entire 
equation (2.7) or (2.8) by FBVj,n(j) or FBCj,n(j)' respectively. 
Note that bank debt, like other debt and unlike equity, is inevitably recorded at nominal 
value.  This means that hold-up behavior, if any, does show up in the estimated cost of capital. 
To see this, note that, in principle, any excessive interest charges do not change the net amount 
paid out or raised, X t - It, nor the true market value of the firm:  they lower the dividends and 
the value of equity, but they simultaneously boost the interest payments and the true market 
value of debt. In our data, however, debt is valued at par.  So if a bank overcharges a customer, 
our data report a lower value of the firm for the same total payouts, implying a higher cost of 
capital. In the return on cost, in contrast, where assets and liabilities are taken at book value, 
neither total payout nor the initial cost of investment are affected by excessive interest fees, 
so the return on cost (or return on investment) is  unaffected.  This would be in contrast to 
the effects of transfer pricing:  if the group's saga sosha siphons off profits by overcharging or 
underpaying for goods, then profitability (re)  is  affected but not the cost of capital (rv). 
3  Data 
Our Japanese data are retrieved from the Pacific-Basin Capital Markets (PACAP) databases 
developed by the Sandra Ann Morsilli Pacific-Basin Capital Markets Research Center at the 
University of Rhode Island.  The annual data on balance sheets and income statements cover 
the 22  fiscal  years  1974 to 1995.  Most  Japanese firms  have a fiscal  year ending in March. 
Thus, fiscal year 1974 runs from April 1, 1974 to March 31, 1975, and so on.  We select all non-
financial firms that have (annual) data on market and book value for at least two consecutive 
years.  As in FF (1999), the capital stock of firms includes only debt that pays explicit interest 
(PACAPs long-term loans and debentures plus short-term loans in current liabilities).  Non-
interest-bearing liabilities are mainly short-term accounts payable (A/P). Book capital is the Keiretsu membership, size, and returns  15 
total end-of-year  book value  of long-term debt  (PACAPs  data items BAL14  and  BAL15), 
short-term debt (BALl1) ,  and equity for  firms  appearing in the corresponding fiscal  year. 
Book  equity is  total assets  (BAL9)  minus total liabilities  (BAL17).  Market  capital is  the 
total end-of-year book value of short- and long-term debts plus the market value  of equity 
(MKTVAL or share price  (MKT3) times shares outstanding (MKT5))  at the end of March, 
regardless whether firms  have a fiscal year end in March.  Deflation, where needed, is  by the 
CP!. 
Given their distinct governance structure, we  are particularly interested in the six major 
Japanese industrial groups, the keiretsu, that existed during the sample period:  the Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Sanwa, and Daiichi Kangyo groups.  Keiretsu membership, being 
a key feature in the Japanese economy, is readily identifiable and stable over time.  However, 
in the literature there is  no unified classification of keiretsu membership.  The keiretsu firms 
in our sample either meet  the classification by Nakatani (1984),  or  are the closely-affiliated 
members  (with the degree of the 2-,  3-,  and 4-star inclination) to the six groups as classified 
in the 1992/93 edition of Industrial  Groupings  in Japan-the Anatomy of the  Keiretsu.  By 
implication, then, our non-keiretsu firms are either the unaffiliated firms or the weakly related 
members (a I-star affinity to the Six Groups). 
3.1  General Description; Distribution across Size and Industry Classes 
In this section we provide some descriptive information that justifies our regression specification 
or will be useful in interpreting the statistical results provided in Section 4.  Table 2 shows 
some summary statistics for the sample.  Over the 22  years 1974-95,  the average number of 
non-financial firms present per year is 1337, of which the keiretsu-affiliated firms account for 
38.8 percent. This is an average; in fact, the keiretsu importance in terms of numbers has been 
dropping from 41.5 percent in the second half of 1970s to 36.1 percent in the first half of 1990s. 
It is well known that equity cross-holdings among business firms are widespread in Japan. 
From Table 2,  the average cross-holdings in each year amounts to 20.1  percent of the total 
market equity of all  non-financial firms,  or 11.1  percent of their total market capital (book 
debt plus market equity).  Equity cross-holdings have steadily decreased, from 21.5  percent of 
equity in 1974-79 to 16.6 percent in 1991-1995.  Not all of this decrease should be ascribed to a 
waning of the the keiretsu system: an important second factor behind this result has been the 
privatisation of NTT, at the time the most valuable company in the world and, of course, not Keiretsu membership, size, and returns  16 
Table 2:  Sample Description 
The table provides the average of annual number of firms,  cross-holding,  book and market capital.  We start 
from  PACAPs fiscal year-end data on the Japanese domestic non- financial firms  (all Japanese Industry Codes 
except 0501-0513) listed in the First and the Second Sections. We choose firms with annual data on market and 
book value of capital for at least two consecutive years.  Keiretsu firms are close members (classified as 2-,3-, or 
4-star) of the Six Major Japanese Industrial Groups.  Non-keiretsu firms is the balance but excluding Utilities 
(Code 0801)  and Communications  (0705).  "Book capital"  is  the total end-of-year  book value of long-term 
debt (PACAP items BAL14 and BAL15), short-term debt (BALU), and equity.  "Book equity"  is total assets 
(BAL9)  minus total liabilities (BAL17).  "Market capital" is the total end-of-year book value of all debt plus 
the market value of equity [(MKTVAL or share price (MKT3) times shares outstanding (MKT5)j at the end of 
March.  From the number of shares owned by the non-financial firms  (JAF78) and the total number of shares 
owned  (JAF81)  in each firm  we  obtain two cross-holding adjustment factors (see French and Poterba, 1991): 
K  =  L;[JAF78 x  MKT3l/L;[JAF81 x  MKT3j and H  =  K  x [TotaIMarketEquityl/[totaIMarketCapitalj. 
Purged of cross-holdings, we measure market equity,  market and book capital by (marketequity) x (1 - K), 
(marketcapital) x  (1  - H), and(bookcapital) x  (1 - H) in trillions of JPY. 
Firms  Cross-Holding  Book Capital  Market Capital 
All  of which  K(%)  H(%)  All  of which  All  of which 
Years  keiretsu (%)  keiretsu (%)  keiretsu (%) 
1974-79  U68  41.45  21.46  8.73  68.25  58.64  93.72  58.01 
1980-85  1296  39.52  21.16  11.36  104.93  55.83  165.30  55.82 
1986-90  1415  37.35  20.52  14.69  167.09  52.14  383.68  49.09 
1991-95  1512  36.13  16.63  9.89  236.70  50.91  373.56  48.81 
1974-95  1337  38.78  20.07  11.07  139.00  54.64  242.74  53.30 
a keiretsu member. The temporary increase of the alternative measure, cross holdings divided 
by total value, during the "bubble" years 1986-90 merely reflects the increase of equity values 
relative to debt values during that period.8 
Table 2 also shows that the time-averaged aggregate market and book capital of all non-
financial firms increases over the sample period.  Their grand averages are 242.7 trillion Yen of 
market value and 139.0 trillion of book value.  Keiretsu firms account for over half of the total 
market and book value before 1986,  but their average market value drops below 50 percent 
afterwards, again reflecting, to a large extent, NTT going public. 
We also verify the distribution across industries.  As we see from Table 3, keiretsu firms are 
few  and far-between in the service industry, and entirely absent from Utilities and Communi-
cations.  This sector is also heavily regulated, and dominated by the atypical giant NTT. Thus, 
whenever we  look for governance effects, we exclude the latter sector.  In the other industries 
the imbalances are less pronounced,  but keiretsu firms  occasionally still account for  close to 
8The Japanese stock market crash following the bubble years happened in 1990.  When we include that year 
into the subperiod 1986-90,  our criterion is merely one of cutting the total sample into sub-samples of equal 
(five) years, as FF (1999) did.  In fact, as can be seen also in the rest of the paper, the effect of the bubble years 
when we  look at the averages for 1985-90 is  not qualltatively influenced by the inclusion of 1990.  Likewise, the 
results of averaging that hold for  1991-95 are also valid for 1990-95. Keiretsu membership, size, and returns  17 
Table 3:  Breakdown of Keiretsu Members across Industries and Size Quintiles 
The table shows  keiretsu  members  presence across  industries and size  quintiles,  in  terms of the average  of 
the annual number of firms,  book capital and market capital for  1974-1995  (See definitions in  Table 2).  We 
exhaustively decompose the Japanese non-financial sector into seven industries:  Construction (Code 201), Man-
ufacturing (301-315)  - itself containing Food,  Textile  & Paper (301-303),  Glass,  Steel & Metal  (304-306), 
(Petro)- Chemical & Rubber (307-310), and Machine & Equipment (311-315)-, Wholesale & Retail (401-402), 
Real estate (601), Service (901), Natural Resource & Transportation (101-103 and 701-704), Utilities &  Com-
munication (705  &  801).  The latter contains NTT, listed as of in  1986.  Size quintiles are formed  by  sorting 
the initial market capital of the firms  that enter the sample at various years,  discounted where necessary to 
1974 using the aggregate FF return on value for keiretsu or non-keiretsu firms  (taken from Table 6).  Quintile 1 
contains the smallest firms. 
Number of Firms  Book Capital  Market Capital 
All  of which  All  of which  All  of which 
keiretsu (%)  keiretsu (%)  keiretsu (%) 
All Firms 
All industries and sizes  1337  38.78  139.00  54.64  242.74  53.30 
By industry 
Construction (industry 1.)  113  21.37  8.57  42.18  13.99  42.84 
Manufacturing (2.-5.)  923  44.48  71.01  65.25  130.34  64.71 
2.  Food, Textile & Paper  166  44.00  9.48  61.61  17.17  63.30 
3. (Petro)-Chemical & Rubbe r  174  54.12  13.40  66.52  25.81  65.84 
4. Glass, Steel & Metal  154  54.98  14.73  68.60  25.16  68.33 
5.  Machine & Equipment  429  36.97  33.40  64.49  62.20  63.23 
Tertiary (6.-10.)  301  27.92  59.46  32.86  98.42  27.40 
6.  Wholesale and Retail  133  29.19  21.66  63.13  30.76  57.26 
7.  Natural Resource, Transport  94  37.36  8.82  36.73  18.73  35.82 
8.  Real estate  19  30.75  3.94  61.20  6.38  66.69 
9.  Service  38  11.19  1.29  16.38  3.18  16.55 
10.  Utilities &  Communication  17  0  23.72  0  39.37  0 
lOa.  Id.  without NTT  16  0  20.67  0  30.44  0 
By Size Quintile 
Quintile 1 (Smallest Firms)  312  19.87  4.93  11.13  7.72  11.99 
Quintile 2  312  26.60  7.56  19.36  12.12  20.66 
Quintile 3  312  33.65  13.73  28.19  22.84  28.37 
Quintile 4  312  37.82  22.82  43.60  39.79  45.10 
Quintile 5 (Largest Firms)  312  57.05  183.33  55.95  307.10  54.18 Keiretsu membership, size, and returns  18 
70 percent of an industry. The second part of Table 3 shows that keiretsu membership is even 
more strongly related to size:  the members of the six traditional industrial groups take up 
more than half of the largest-firms quintile, but become more and more under-represented as 
one descends the size  scale.  As  there are strong priors that size  and type of business affect 
returns, it is quite important to filter out size- and industry-related factors in IRRs. 
3.2  Capital Structure 
Table 4 provides some information on the capital structures of the two groups.  Relative to 
the U.S.,  the average  Japanese firm  borrows more.  This is  especially so  for  keiretsu firms, 
which,  conform to the conventional picture,  take on  far  more  bank debt,  both short- and 
(especially) long-term.  Straight bonds are also more intensively used by keiretsu firms,  but 
even this reflects their banking connections:  such debentures are typically issued through and 
guaranteed by main banks.  Non-keiretsu firms, by implication, then rely to a larger extent on 
equity and (marginally so)  on equity-linked debt.  In the traditional pecking-order theory of 
Myers (1984), this reliance on equity should imply a higher required return on value . 
.  Changes in capital structure are shown in Table 5.  The format of the table follows the cash 
constraint 
(3.9) 
where yt denotes earnings before interest but after taxes, Deprt depreciation, t::.St  net stock 
issues,  t::.LTDt  net issues of long-term debt,  t::.STDt net issues of short-term debt, Invt in-
vestments, Divt the dividend payout, and Intt the interest paid.  All figures in the table are 
annual data rescaled by beginning-of-year book value and then averaged over time. 
From Table 5, non-keiretsu firms' annual investment has been, on average, higher than that 
of keiretsu firms by almost one percent of book value.  The higher investments by non-keiretsu 
firms are made possible by lower interest payments (reflecting lower leverage) and more equity 
issues.  Interestingly, as of 1990, both groups have cut down  their investments by about half, 
while simultaneously departing from  Myers'  (1984)  traditional pecking order by a  relatively 
higher reliance on new equity.  In the most recent subperiod, keiretsu firms actually have been 
reacting to a Myers  (1977)  debt-overhang problem by withdrawing short-term debt.  Their 
choice of short-term debt as the item where cuts were needed may signal that their financial Keiretsu membership, size, and returns  19 
Table 4:  Japanese Keiretsu and Non-Keiretsu Capital Structures 
Entries are average  shares  of different  classes of liabilities, in  percent of total market capital)  for  keiretsu and 
non-keiretsu firms in the sample at the end of each fiscal year-first for all Industry 1-9 firms (Panel A), and then 
separately for  size quintile 5 (Panel B)  and quintiles 1-4  (Panel C).  Keiretsu/non-keiretsu adherence, quintiles, 
and equity are as defined in Table 3.  Short-term debt is PACAPs data item BALl1, long-term debt is Long-term 
Loans (BAL14) plus Debentures (BAL15), which in turn consist of Bonds (JAF50) and Convertibles (JAF51). 
Year  Equity  Long-Term Debt  ST Debt 
Total  Loan  Bond  Convrtbl 
Panel A:  Keiretsu vs.  non-Keiretsu, all sizes 
Keiretsu Firms 
1974-80  36.92  34.41  27.43  5.27  1.70  28.67 
1981-85  49.63  25.79  18.60  5.37  1.82  24.58 
1986-90  65.62  18.03  9.06  6.83  2.14  16.35 
1991-95  55.20  25.42  11.16  10.91  3.35  19.38 
1974-95  50.49  26.69  17.55  6.93  2.20  22.83 
Non-keiretsu Firms 
1974-80  45.13  27.86  23.61  2.57  1.68  27.00 
1981-85  58.64  18.40  13.25  2.83  2.33  22.96 
1986-90  72.73  13.19  5.98  4.75  2.46  14.08 
1991-95  63.05  19.64  9.10  7.11  3.42  17.31 
1974-95  58.55  20.51  13.95  4.16  2.40  20.94 
Panel B: Keiretsu VS.  non-Keiretsu in Size Quintile 5 
Keiretsu Firms 
1974-80  34.02  36.87  29.08  5.98  1.81  29.12 
1981-85  45.57  28.75  20.73  6.25  1.77  25.69 
1986-90  63.06  19.76  10.35  7.48  1.93  17.18 
1991-95  52.36  27.56  12.45  11.96  3.16  20.08 
1974-95  47.60  28.82  18.98  7.70  2.14  23.58 
Non-keiretsu Firms 
1974-80  38.85  34.32  28.80  3.56  1.96  26.83 
1981-85  50.91  24.13  18.16  4.08  1.89  24.96 
1986-90  69.87  16.03  8.39  5.69  1.94  14.10 
1991-95  58.55  24.25  12.51  8.70  3.03  17.20 
1974-95  53.45  25.35  17.84  5.29  2.21  21.20 
Panel C:  Keiretsu vs.  Non-keiretsu firms in Size Quintile 1-4 
Keiretsu Firms 
1974-80  53.28  20.50  18.12  1.27  1.12  26.21 
1981-85  68.24  12.10  8.74  1.28  2.07  19.66 
1986-90  77.19  10.15  3.10  3.92  3.13  12.66 
1991-95  69.30  14.78  4.74  5.72  4.32  15.92 
1974-95  66.18  14.92  9.67  2.78  2.48  18.90 
Non-keiretsu Firms 
1974-80  55.34  17.11  150  0.89  1.22  27.56 
1981-85  68.29  11.10  7.03  1.27  2.80  20.61 
1986-90  75.77  10.20  3.35  3.77  3.08  14.03 
1991-95  67.94  14.61  5.37  5.37  3.88  17.45 
1974-95  65.74  13.52  8.32  2.63  2.57  20.74 Keiretsu membership, size,  and returns  20 
Table 5:  Japanese Keiretsu and Non-keiretsu Cash In- and Outflows 
The table shows the average of annual cash in- and outflows as percents of aggregate year-start book capital for 
keiretsu and non-keiretsu firms (Panel A), in size quintile 5 (Panel B), and in size quintile 1-4 (Panel C). See the 
definitions of keiretsu, non-keiretsu, and size quintiles in Tables 2 and 3.  Components of the cash in- and outflows 
are expressed as percents of cash inflows, which balance cash outflows:  Y -t+Dep,+l>.St+l>.LTD,+l>.STDt  = 
It + Div, + Int,.  Y  - t  is  the sum of net income (PACAPs data item INC9) and interest expense (JAF67), 
Depr, is depreciation expense (JAF74). l>.LTD, is the change in the book value of the sum of long-term loans 
(BAL14) and debenture (BAL15) from t - 1 to t.  l>.ST D, is the change in the book value of short-term debt 
(BALll). Investment, I"  is the change in book capital from t-l  to t, plus depreciation. Int, is  interest expense 
(JAF67).  Div, is dividend [dividend per share (MKTl) times shares outstanding (MKT5)].  The net flow  from 
the sale and repurchase of stock, l>.St  =  I, + Div, + Int, - Yt - Dep, -l>.STD, -l>.LTDt, balances the cash 
flow  identity. 
Year  Y  Depr  l>.S  l>.LTD  l>.  STD  Inv  Div  Int 
Panel A:  Keiretsu vs.  Non-keiretsu,  all firms 
Keiretsu firms 
1975-80  11.09  4.91  0.15  2.69  1.84  1l.27  1.25  8.16 
1981-85  10.59  5.72  0.26  1.59  1.99  1l.81  1.26  7.08 
1986-90  8.30  5.79  1.43  3.95  1.99  15.52  1.23  4.70 
1991-95  5.02  4.34  1.57  0.67  -0.26  7.31  0.84  3.18 
1975-95  8.86  5.18  0.82  2.25  1.41  1l.47  1.15  5.90 
Non-Keiretsu firms 
1975-80  1l.19  5.50  0.89  1.37  1.75  11.79  1.47  7.44 
1981-85  10.16  5.81  0.80  1.17  2.16  12.49  1.51  6.09 
1986-90  7.87  5.24  2.20  4.89  1.82  16.91  1.43  3.69 
1991-95  4.76  3.69  1.68  0.43  0.99  8.02  0.90  2.62 
1975-95  8.62  5.08  1.37  1.94  1.68  12.28  1.33  5.08 
Panel B: Keiretsu vs.  Non-keiretsu in Size Quintile 5 
Keiretsu firms 
1975-80  10.96  4.73  0.01  3.12  1.98  1l.37  1.2  8.22 
1981-85  10.54  5.55  0.03  1.65  2.01  11.33  1.2  7.25 
1986-90  8.35  5.71  1.15  3.89  2.10  15.07  1.19  4.95 
1991-95  5.13  4.36  1.54  0.83  -0.56  7.11  0.82  3.37 
1974-95  8.86  5.08  0.67  2.38  1.39  11.22  1.11  6.05 
Keiretsu firms 
1975-80  10.98  5.72  0.41  1.82  1.83  11.6  1.31  7.85 
1981-85  10.12  6.01  0.23  0.64  2.29  11.12  1.34  6.83 
1986-90  7.83  5.68  1.54  5.25  0.71  15.38  1.37  4.28 
1991-95  5.04  4.01  1.5  0.55  1.11  8.28  0.88  3.04 
1974-95  8.61  5,37  0.94  2.05  1.49  11.65  1.24  5.58 
Panel C:  Keiretsu vs.  Non-keiretsu in Size Quintiles 1-4 
Keiretsu firms 
1975-80  1l.95  6.08  1.06  0.08  0.97  10.65  1.54  7.79 
1981-85  10.94  6.81  1.67  1.24  1.84  14.85  1.62  6.03 
1986-90  8.02  6.21  3.03  4.29  1.35  18.16  1.49  3.25 
1991-95  4.44  4.28  1.77  -0.19  1.42  8.58  0.95  2.2 
1974-95  8.98  5.9  1.83  1.28  1.45  13.09  1.42  4.93 
Non-keiretsu firms 
1975-80  11.59  5.09  1.76  0.35  1.55  11.9  1.76  6.67 
1981-85  10.22  5.51  1.67  1.9  1.95  14.5  1.78  4.97 
1986-90  7.92  4.75  2.9  4.58  3.21  18.84  1.5  3.02 
1991-95  4.46  3.34  1.86  0.3  0.87  7.75  0.92  2.17 
1974-95  8.7  4.67  2.01  1.72  1.89  13.15  1.5  4.34 Keiretsu membership, size,  and returns  21 
health was  worse than that of non-keiretsu firms.9  Still,  many differences in Table 5 are of 
uncertain economic insignificance; and it is hard to detect an overarching pattern.  Thus, we 
now turn to the central issues of the paper, the estimated returns on investment and required 
return on value from which, it turns out, a coherent picture emerges.  For exploratory purposes, 
we first start with the results from the original FF approach. 
3.3  Fama-French Point Estimates of the IRRs:  Comparison to U.S.  and 
Robustness Checks 
While in many respects the regression-based results are more informative than the FF point 
estimates,  the latter are suitable if the objective is  to compare with the U.S.  results or to 
explore the sensitivity of the IRRs to the terminal date.  Regression-based IRRs do  not lend 
themselves easily for  comparison with FF's U.S.  results because our methodology is different; 
and to obtain an idea of the evolution of cost and return over time, the regressions are not 
convenient either because each estimation produce 90  separate IRRs (nine sectors times five 
size classes times two governance systems).  Panel A of Table 6 shows the estimates of IRR on 
value and cost, nominal and real, in Japanese Yen (JPY) and U.S. dollar (USD), of all Japanese 
non-financials, keiretsu versus non-keiretsu firms,  and individual industries for  1974-95.  The 
underlying cash flows  are available on request. 
When denominated in (undeflated) JPY, the estimate of IRR on value of all non-financials 
is 8.01 percent and the estimate of IRR on cost is 11.34 percent. Thus, on average the Japanese 
non-financial corporate sector has added value over the past two decades at a nominal rate 
of 3.33  percent per year.  Adjusting the cash flows  in equations (2.1)  and  (2.2)  for  inflation 
only lowers both legs of the cost-benefit spread by essentially the same number (to 4.95 versus 
7.94 percent, respectively) and does not materially influence the spread itself (3.0 percent in 
real terms).  Panel A of Table 6  also  shows  estimates of IRR on value  and cost of keiretsu 
and  non-keiretsu  firms  separately.  Over the entire  period,  non-keiretsu  firms  added  more 
percentage value than did keiretsu firms.  Both legs of the spread contribute positively to this 
result.  Non-keiretsu firms  had not only a  lower  cost  of capital (IRR on  value:  8.61  versus 
9Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991) argue that firms that anticipate an imminent improvement in  credit 
ratings have  a  greater incentive to borrow short-term.  In the U.S.,  Guedes and Opler (1996)  find  that firms 
with good credit ratings issue not just long-term but also short-term debt, while firms with speculative-grade 
credit ratings borrow in the middle of the maturity spectrum.  Also James (1987)  shows that investors tend 
to take firms'  increase in (short-term) bank debt as a favorable signal.  Thus, we  can interpret the short-debt 
withdrawing evidence as bad information. Keiretsu membership, size, and returns  22 
Table 6:  IRRs on Value and Cost, 1974-95, Computed from Aggregated Data 
The table shows the IRRs on value and cost,  defined in equations (2.1)  and (2.2),  for  all non-financial firms, 
keiretsu and non-keiretsu firms (in Panel A), and industrial sectors (Panel B), over 1974-95.  Keiretsu definition 
and industrial sectors are as in Tables 2 and 3.  The IRR on value measures the return on investments of when 
one  (i)  acquires all firms at market value when they enter the sample,  (ii) cashes in all  interim payouts and 
subscribes to all new issues, and (iii) sells at market value either when a firm leaves the sample before 1995 or 
when the portfolio is liquidated (1995).  The IRR on cost assumes corporate assets are acquired at book, rather 
than market value.  Annual nominal cash flows  in USD are converted from the original JPY cash flows  using 
the USD/JPY rate in each end-March (from PACAP). We compute real IRRs by  using annual nominal cash 
flows in JPY (or in USD) divided by the Japanese (or U.S.) Consumer Price Index in March (from PACAP and 
CRSP). Returns are in percents, p.a  .. 
IRR on Value  IRR on Cost  IRR on Value  IRRon Cost 
in JPY  in JPY  in USD  in USD 
Nominal  Real  Nominal  Real  Nominal  Real  Nominal  Real 
Panel A: All Firms, and by governance type 
All N  on-financials  8.01  4.95  11.34  7.94  13.24  7.63  16.89  10.86 
Keiretsu  9.07  5.71  11.26  7.73  14.56  8.61  16.86  10.72 
Non-keiretsu  8.61  5.56  11.74  8.42  13.96  8.33  17.29  11.34 
Panel B: By Industrial Sector 
1.  Construction  7.97  4.89  10.31  7.04  13.41  10.17  15.88  12.45 
2.  Food, Textile & Paper  8.72  5.37  11.36  7.77  14.04  10.54  16.83  13.09 
3.  (Petro)-Chem. &  Rubber  9.66  6.32  12.02  8.47  15.21  11.70  17.70  13.98 
4.  Glass, Steel & Metal  8.94  5.32  11.47  7.62  14.43  10.63  17.10  13.06 
5.  Machine & Equipment  9.22  6.12  12.12  8.78  14.79  11.52  17.84  14.31 
6.  Wholesale &  Retail  8.92  5.65  11.04  7.58  14.29  10.87  16.55  12.92 
7.  Natural Res.  & Transport  8.01  4.87  11.45  8.07  13.20  9.93  16.97  13.43 
8.  Real estate  7.34  4.57  9.44  6.55  12.75  9.83  14.90  11.87 
9.  Service  7.16  4.74  12.76  9.86  12.65  10.09  18.48  15.42 
10.  Utilities & Com.  3.26  1.06  10.37  7.29  7.51  5.30  15.73  12.52 
lOa.  Id.  without NTT  9.11  5.94  9.89  6.70  14.52  11.20  15.36  12.02 Keiretsu membership, size, and returns  23 
9.07 percent, and adjusted for inflation, 5.56 versus 5.71  percent) but also a higher return on 
corporate investment  (IRR on cost:  11.74 versus 11.26,  and after inflation,  8.42  versus 7.73 
percent).l0  As  we  shall  see  below,  these aggregate numbers are  somewhat misleading:  the 
"average"  keiretsu's return-on-investment shortfall is  essentially due to the top size-quintile, 
while the cost-of-capital handicap originates from the mid- and small-caps.  Be it as it may, 
the picture thus far runs counter to the traditional perception that keiretsu firms benefit from 
a corporate governance system with internal financing sources. 
As  noted before, the above results are just point estimates without information regarding 
(in-)  significance; also, they are likely to be dominated by the largest firms in each group and do 
not control for size and industry differences across the keiretsu/non-keiretsu divide.  Industry 
does seem to make a difference.  For example, in Panel B, among the nine sectors that include 
both keiretsu and non-keiretsu, the estimated IRRs on value in JPY have a range of 2.5 percent 
p.a., varying from 7.16  percent (construction) to 9.66 percent (services).  But even this result 
must be partly due to size effects.  Thus, pending a more careful analysis below, the FF-style 
IRRs are mostly interesting for  purposes of international comparison. 
When we  translate all cash flows  into USD at the contemporaneous spot ratell and then 
compute the USD-based IRRs shown in Panel A of Table 6, the estimates of the IRR on value 
and on cost for  all Japanese non-financials both increase by very similar amounts-roughly, 
the average per annum appreciation of JPY-to 13.24 and 16.89 respectively.  The estimates 
in real terms are 7.63 and 10.86 percent.  These estimates are larger than the U.S.  numbers in 
FF (1999).  Thus, the conventional claim that Japan's cost of capital is  much below the cost 
of capital elsewhere in the world (for example, McCauley and Zimmer, 1989) is confounded by 
lOEstimates of return on value for all non-financials fall below both the estimates for keiretsu and non-keiretsu 
firms because Sector 10, Utilities and Communications, in which there has been no keiretsu presence, is excluded 
when keiretsu and non-keiretsu samples are selected.  NTT (in Sector lO)  went public in 1986, near the peak of 
the Japanese equity market, and with its enormous weight it substantially lowers the estimate return on value 
for the value-weighted sample of all non-financials. 
11 An implicit assumption of this translated-cash-flow approach is  that capital markets are integrated, oth-
erwise the buying and selling of Japanese assets at any desired  date is  impossible.  In reality,  however,  the 
opening-up of Japan's capital market really started only in early 80s (and slowly so, at that).  A second problem 
is the assumption that the long-term realized evolution of the exchange rate is close to the expectations.  (This 
problem of course applies also for  any other variable  in  this model,  e.g.  stock prices  and cpr levels.)  The 
latter problem would be solved if,  instead of valuing the project as such, we value the project hedged against 
exchange risk.  Under this approach, the USD-based return on the hedged asset is,  a priori,  roughly equal to 
the JPY-based return plus the difference between the USD  and JPY risk-free rates.  To implement his  second 
approach we need to identify lithe"  foreign and domestic risk-free rates in a sample covering 22 years and having 
non-flat term structures at all dates.  Thus, we have chosen the first approach. Keiretsu membership, size, and returns  24 
a numeraire effect.12 
We add two (descriptive) robustness checks on the positive sign of Value Added. First, the 
cost of assets is likely to be underestimated because of historic-cost accounting and expensing of 
investments in intangibles (R & D, training, advertising). How large can the measurement error 
in cost  be without overturning our conclusion that Japans corporate return on cost exceeds 
cost of capital? It turns out that Value Added would drop to zero if our estimated book value 
of entering firms would understate replacement cost by 62 percent for all non-financials, by 37 
percent for  keiretsu firms,  and by 56  percent for  non-keiretsu firms.  (The FF figure  for  the 
U.S. over a similar period is  35 percent.)  Thus, it is unlikely that the underestimation of the 
cost of assets would come anywhere near the levels needed to invalidate the conclusions. 
In a second robustness check, we compute the IRRs on value and cost in JPY for different 
termination dates.  To  that end, we  compute IRRs for  termination year 1985 using the data 
of 1974-85, and we obtain similar estimates for each of the years 1986 to 1995 by sequentially 
adding back more data years  at the end.  Figure l.A depicts the evolution of estimates of 
both nominal and real IRRs for  all non-financial firms  from termination years 1985 to 1995. 
The IRRs are highest for  termination years 1987-88 and lowest  for  the 1990s,  refiecting the 
movements of the Japanese stock prices.  In real term, the plots just shift down in an almost-
parallel fashion.  The evolution of IRRs is predictably smooth because each estimate shares at 
least 90  percent of the data with the adjacent years.  The spread between IRR on cost  and 
value, whether nominal or real, remains positive for any termination date. Thus, our conclusion 
that the firms have been adding value is not qualitatively sensitive to the termination year. 
Still,  it  is  true that the net performance  of  all  firms  has  slipped  in recent  years,  and 
especially so  in the keiretsu segment.  This is obvious from the evolution of the value-added 
spreads in Figure I.e.:  while both IRRs went on rising as long as the stock market rally (or 
bubble)  lasted  (see  Figure I.E), the benefit-cost spreads for  both keiretsu and non-keiretsu 
have been shrinking as of 1985.  Perhaps not coincidentally, 1985  is  also the date as of which 
Japan's share in world  exports starts declining.  It seems that Japan's problems predate the 
12FF find that, for the U.S. non-financials, the nominal and real IRRs on value are 11.78 and 5.57 percent and 
the nominal and real IRRs on cost are 13.97 and 7.52 percent for  1973-96.  It is  not obvious whether the U.S.-
Japan difference is  significant, and,  if so, whether its cause is  a size or  industry effect, a difference in  risk, or  a 
result of market segmentation. Note also that, like in the FF study, our results are strongly dominated by initial 
value,  with net intermediate cashfLows  as  the second-important factor  and  with  assets sold as  a very  distant 
third. When net cashflows are split into investment outflows and financing inflows, each of these separately gets 
a large weight. Keiretsu membership, size, and returns  25 
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stock-market collapse.  A second observation from the graphs is the rates of decline, keiretsu 
versus non-keiretsu, seem to diverge in the early 90s, with the keiretsu Value Added dropping 
markedly faster than the non-keiretsu one for subsequent years. 
After this exploratory look at the data we now turn to a statistically more careful analysis 
of the 1974-95 IRRs. 
4  Regression Estimates of IRRs on Value and Cost, and Value 
Added 
We first look at the performance in the segment of large firms, the most eye-catching segment 
of Japan's corporate sector but, as we shall see,  not necessarily representative for it. We then 
present the empirical findings for  the smaller firms.  The interpretation of these observations 
follows in subsection 4.2. 
4.1  Empirical findings 
For convenience,  we  reproduce, below,  the return-on-cost and return-on-value specifications, 
(2.5) and (2.6), that are substituted into the regression equations (2.7)  and (2.8)  : 
10  4 
rv,j = :L)av,i + bv,iKj)Ii,j + l)ev,s + fv,sKj)Ss,j' 
i=l  8=1 
and 
10  4 
rc,j = :L)aC,i + bc,iKj)Ii,j + l)ec,s + fc,sKj)Ss,j· 
i=l  8=1 
The regressions are run jointly, using GMM with the regressors as instruments. To handle 
outliers, we ranked the firms on the basis of the ratio (final market value)j(initial book value), 
and trimmed the upper five percent.13  Panels A and B of Table 7 present the estimates for the 
industry and size factors in the cost of capital (or return on value, r v), return on investment 
at cost (rc),  and the value-added spread (rc  - rv).  All returns and spreads, being based on 
deflated cash-flows, are real numbers.  As there is no keiretsu presence in Industry 10 (Utilities 
and Telecommunications), we  omit that sector from the estimation and its dummy from the 
equation; thus, all tables produce parameters for  industries 1 to 9 only.  As can be seen from 
13Smaller trims (results available on request) have the effect of increasing the IRRs slightly but do  not affect 
the return patterns across industries and sizes. Keiretsu membership, size,  and returns  27 
the above equations,  the all-dummies-zero base case is  a large  (i.e.  quintile-5)  non-keiretsu 
firm.  The columns labeled Tv,i  and  Te,i  in Panel Al display,  for  the base-case firms  in each 
of the industries, the IRRs on value and cost, respectively,  next to the value-added spreads, 
ae,i - av,i'  Panel A2, to the right, shows for each industry the differential IRR and value-added 
factors,  bv,i,  be,i,  and be,i  - bv,i,  for  keiretsu firms in the same top-size  class;  thus, a positive 
coefficient in Panel A2 means that, for keiretsu firms, the parameter is estimated to be higher 
than for non-keiretsu firms.  Panel Bl, next, shows the differential factors between small and 
large  non-keiretsu firms,  ev,S.  ee,s.  and  ee,s  - ev,s  for  size  classes  s  = 1, .. .4.  For symmetry 
and convenience of interpretation, the differential factors for  small- and mid-cap keiretsu are 
shown relative to large ones; that is, we display ev,s + fv,s.  ee,s +  fe,s. and ee,s +  fe,s - ev,s - fv,s 
rather than just the f  parts. Lastly, we also show, in Table 8, the keiretsu/non-keiretsu return 
differential, for each of the industries i = 1, ... ,9 and small- and mid-cap quintiles s = 1, ... ,4. 
These differentials are given by be,i + fe,s,  bv,i + fv,s,  and be,i + fe,s  - bv,i  - fv,s'  The model's 
fit, as measured by the corrected R-squared, is 40 percent for the cost equation and 70 percent 
for the value equation. 
Figure 2 can be used  as  a navigation guide to the interpretation of the parameters, the 
layout of Table 7 and 8, and the discussion of the empirical results. The 2 x 2 box refers to the 
main subdivisions (keiretsu/non-keiretsu, large/smaller). In each of its four corners, the figure 
shows the parameter combination needed to compute the levels  of the IRRs for the chosen 
size x governance combination.  The largish two-headed arrows that link two adjacent boxes 
refer to comparisons between two sizexgovernance combinations.  The boxed symbols within 
these arrows show the parameters used to test for  the corresponding differences in IRRs, and 
the text in these arrows summarizes the salient findings. 
Before turning to these findings, we first internally validate a finding obtained earlier with 
the FF-methodology:  Value  Added is  now found  to be positive not just for  the aggregate, 
but also across governance groups, size classes, and industries, and significantly so.  The VA-
column in Table 7.Al demonstrates this directly for  the Q5  size  class  of non-keiretsu firms, 
but a  positive benefit/cost spread also obtains for  each and every other subsample,  and the 
numbers are significant in all  9 x 5 x 2 cells bar one  (tables available on request).  Our main 
interest, however, is in the differences between subgroups.  In what follows,  we  discuss each of 
the four sizexgovernance comparisons shown in Figure 2. 
The first issue is whether keiretsu membership makes a difference among large firms (quin-Keiretsu membership, size, and returns  28 
Figure 2:  Overview of models and empirical findings 
The figure  provides a navigation guide to the interpretation of the parameters, the layout of Tables 7 and 8, 
and the discussion of the empirical results on the parameter estimates of return on value  (or cost of capital), 
TVI and return on cost (on investment), Tc:: 
9  4  9  4 
rv,;  =  ~)av,; + bv,;K;)I;,; +  ~)ev" + /v"K;)S"j  ,  re,j  =  ~)a,,;  +be,;Kj)I;,; +  ~)ee" + /e"Kj)S,,;. 
i=1  ";=1  s=l 
The 2-by-2  box  refers  to the main subdivisions  (keiretsu/non-keiretsu,  large/smaller).  In each if its four 
corners, the figure shows the parameter combination needed to compute the levels of the IRRs for the chosen 
size/governance combination.  The largish two-headed arrows that link  two  adjacent boxes refer  to compar-
isons between two size/governance combinations.  The circled symbols  in these arrows show the parameters 
used to test for the corresponding differences in IRRs, and the text in these arrows summarizes the main findings. 
non-keiretsu 
a+b 
scorecard for keiretsu firms (small- and mid-cap) 
•  r  : predominantlyhighjer, incl QI 
•  r~: no clear pattern, except QI (higher) 
•  re-rv: no clear pattern, except QI (higher) Keiretsu membership, size,  and returns  29 
Table 7:  Estimates of Real IRR and Value-Added:  levels by industry and differentials across 
size classes and governance types 
The regressions estimate the real IRRs and Value Added for keiretsu and non-keiretsu firms.  The IRRs on value 
and cost are modeled as 
9  4  9  4 
rv,; = L(av,i + bv,iK;)Ii'; + L(ev,. + f.,.Kj)B.,;  ,  r"j = L(a"i + b"iKj)Ii,; + L(e"s + fc,.Kj)B"j' 
,=1  s=1  i=l  8=1 
The regressors (shown as upper-case symbols) are dummies, with Ii,;, i =  1, .'"  9, indicating firm j's membership 
of industry i, Kj its membership of one of the six keiretsu, and B.,;,8 =  1, ... ,4, its belonging to 8-th size 
quintile.  Industries, keiretsu membership and size quintile are as defined in Tables 2 and 3.  Panel Al presents 
the estimates of IRRs and Value Added by industry for the largest (quintile 5)  non-keiretsu firms, while Panel 
A2 present the corresponding keiretsu differentials (still for large firms).  Panels B1 and B2 show the size effects 
(quintile-s versus quintile-5 differential) in the IRRs as well as in Value Added, for  non-keiretsu and keiretsu, 
respectively.  We estimate by cross-sectional GMM (1462  firms)  using the regressors as instruments, and the 
t-values are based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.  Cash flows are CPI-deflated and returns are 
in real p.a.  percentages. 
Panel A:  Industrial Real IRRs and Value Added of Non-vs.  Keiretsu Large (Quintile 5)  Firms 
A1.  Estimated a_,j  A2.  Estimated b_,j 
(IRR and Value Added, large non-keiretsu)  (Keiretsu Effect for Large Firms, relative to AI) 
Industry  rv  t-test  rc  t-test  VA  t-test  f)"rv  t-test  Ar,  t-test  AVA  t-test 
1  5.97  15.90  9.14  14.20  3.17  6.78  -1.04  -1.80  -1.64  -2.04  -0.60  -0.99 
2  5.45  14.33  8.95  15.53  3.50  7.90  -0.27  -0.59  -0.82  -1.04  -0.55  -0.86 
3  6.23  14.99  9.73  15.90  3.50  7.72  -0.52  -1.09  -1.79  -2.57  -1.27  -2.53 
4  5.64  17.23  9.41  15.04  3.77  6.99  0.32  0.76  -1.19  -1.62  -1.51  -2.55 
5  5.41  17.16  9.39  15.40  3.97  7.83  0.27  0.71  -1.38  -2.03  -1.65  -3.00 
6  4.83  12.52  9.36  13.04  4.53  6.85  1.49  2.42  -0.76  -0.84  -2.25  -3.00 
7  4.94  11.72  7.95  13.18  3.01  7.81  -1.08  -1.81  -1.97  -2.74  -0.89  -1.97 
8  4.38  9.22  8.63  6.96  4.26  3.91  0.64  0.68  -1.59  -0.99  -2.23  -1.83 
9  4.52  6.69  10.33  9.69  5.81  6.32  0.35  0.17  -2.57  -1.27  -2.92  -2.24 
all zero?  X' (4)  prob  X'(9)  prob  X'(9)  prob  X'(9)  prob  X'(9)  prob  X'(9)  prob 
Wald X'  537.1  0.00  361.3  0.00  85.41  0.00  18.78  0.03  11.82  0.22  16.8  0.05 
all equal?  X'(8)  prob  X'(8)  prob  X'(8)  prob  X'(8)  prob  X'(8)  prob  X'(8}  prob 
Wald X'  21.26  0.01  9.57  0.3  23.75  0  18.71  0.02  3.74  0.88  12.33  0.14 
Panel B:  Non-keiretsu and Keiretsu-specific Size Effects in Real IRRs and Value Added 
B1.  Estimated e_,s  B2.  Estimated e_,. + f-.• 
(non-keiretsu size effect relative to large ones)  (keiretsu size effect relative to large ones) 
Quintile  f)"rv '  t-test  Ar,  t-test  AVA  t-test  f)"rv  t-test  Ar,  t-test  AVA  t-test 
4  -0.58  -1.67  -1.11  -1.88  -0.53  -1.04  0.28  1.06  0.90  2.55  0.62  2.57 
3  -0.29  -0.85  -0.87  -1.46  -0.58  -1.18  0.05  0.19  0.37  0.78  0.32  0.79 
2  0.54  1.77  -1.02  -1.78  -1.57  -3.26  0.78  2.84  0.58  1.55  -0.19  -0.87 
(small) 1  0.76  1.98  -1.51  -2.34  -2.27  -4.71  1.70  5.07  1.50  2.92  -0.20  -0.54 
all zero?  X'(4)  prob  X'(4)  prob  X' (4)  prob  X'(4)  prob  X'(4)  prob  X' (4)  prob 
Wald X'  22.91  0.00  2.12  0.55  50.22  0.00  30.33  0.00  12.39  0.01  11.45  0.02 
all equal?  X'(4)  prob  X'(4)  prob  X'(4)  prob  X'(4)  prob  X' (4)  prob  X'(4)  prob 
Wald X'  22.9  0.00  5.95  0.20  59.66  0.00  6.91  0.07  11.89  0.01  10.87  om Keiretsu membership, size, and returns  30 
tile 5, or Q5). The estimates of differential return on value, .6.rv, provide no support whatsoever 
for the hypothesis that, at least for Q5 firms, keiretsu membership brings along a lower required 
return on value:  across the nine industries, the four instances of negative return differentials 
(indicating a lower cost of capital for keiretsu members) are insignificant and marginally out-
numbered by positive differences  (of which one  is significant).  In light of the heterogeneous 
signs of the coefficients, the significance of the Wald test cannot be interpreted as providing 
evidence for  a lower required return on value either.  In terms of the return-on-cost differen-
tial .6.rc, however, we  do see consistent and large differences:  all estimates are negative (that 
is,  Q5 keiretsus' investments provide unambiguously lower payoffs than those of similar-sized 
unaffiiated firms),  and about half of these estimates  are  individually significant.  Also,  the 
profitability gap  tends to be economically substantial:  estimated return differences  always 
exceed one  percent, and are always  more than large enough to outweigh any cost-of-capital 
advantage a keiretsu firm may have enjoyed.  All resulting differential value-added spreads are 
estimated to be negative, with six or seven of them significantly so.  The Wald test confirms 
this conclusion. 
These results from large firms,  with keiretsu firms  enjoying no cost-of-capital edge  and 
reaping a lower return on investment, does not necessarily reveal the full picture.  As  argued 
in Section 2.1, many of the governance-related effects,  if any,  may be much more noticeable 
among smaller firms.  The size-factor estimates for keiretsu and non-keiretsu firms are in Panel 
B of Table 7. 
We again start with the cost of capital (or IRR on value).  The ev  coefficients in Table 
7.Bl show that, relative to large corporations in the same industry, medium-sized non-keiretsu 
firms  (quintiles 4 and 3)  may have enjoyed a somewhat lower  required return on value;  but 
the evidence of that is, at best, statistically shaky, and there is no obvious Bayesian prior in 
favor of such an effect either. What does seem certain is that the smallest non-keiretsu firms, 
quintiles 2 and 1, did face stiffer costs of capital, up to 0.75 percent higher than the large firms. 
The same size-effect is found,  even stronger, among keiretsu firms,  where the cost-of-capital 
differential,  .6.rv  in Panel B2,  rises monotonically the smaller the firm becomes.  Although 
these IRRs-on-value are not quite the same as average holding-period returns, our finding of a 
size factor in IRRs-on-value is  in line with many others' findings, starting with Banz (1981), 
regarding size effects in expected holding-period returns on stocks. 
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each governance group, so for quintiles 1-4 we still have to compute the total returns before we 
can compare keiretsu firms  to non-keiretsu ones.  Table 8 provides this information for  every 
industryxsize combination.  Panel A shows that in the mid- and small-cap segment (and unlike 
what we saw for large firms) keiretsu firms tend to have a systematically different cost of capital 
relative to non-keiretsu ones.  By and large, the keiretsu firms seem to be the disadvantaged 
ones:  25  out of the 36  (bv + Iv)-estimates are  positive, all of the significant t-statistics are 
positive, and the Wald tests clearly reject a zero effect. 
The results for return on investment (IRR on cost) for  our small- and mid-cap firms are 
less clear.  First look at the size factors within each governance group.  Among non-keiretsu 
firms (Table 7.B1), small firms do monotonically and significantly worse than large ones, while 
within the keiretsu segment small firms  notch up clearly higher returns than do  large ones 
(Panel B2).  Recall, however, that the basis of comparison for  the latter result is  low:  as we 
saw, large keiretsu firms realized particularly unimpressive returns on investments.  When we 
directly compare,  for  smaller firms within each  industry, the returns for  keiretsu and non-
keiretsu firms-see be + Ie  in Table 8.B-the picture is  mixed.  The smallest  (Q1)  keiretsu 
firms  do seem to have provided higher returns than did non-keiretsu ones,  but in the three 
midcap quintiles the positive-to-negative tally is  only 17 to 10,  and not a single coefficient  is 
significant. 
We finish with a look at Value Added for Ql-4 firms.  The size factors within each gover-
nance group, ee - ev for non-keiretsu and ee - ev + Ie - Iv for keiretsu firms, are found in Table 
7,  Panel B1  and B2  respectively.  The smaller a  non-keiretsu firm,  the lower  its percentage 
value-added spread.  Smallish keiretsu firms,  in contrast, do better than large ones;  but this 
effect  is  not monotone in size,  and seems  to be mostly a  reflection of the particularly bad 
performance among the largest keiretsu firms.  In effect, when we directly compare the Ql-4 
value-addeds, industry by industry, across the governance groups (Table 8.C), a clear difference 
emerges only for  the smallest size quintile.  For the mid  caps in Q4-2,  indeed,  10  coefficients 
are positive against 17 negative,  and no result is significant.  In contrast, for Ql only three 
coefficients are negative (and insignificantly so, at that) while three of the six positive ones are 
significant. 
The remaining issue is  how all these findings may fit together.  We  start with our results 
for large corporations, and then turn to the smaller firms to narrow down the list of possible 
interpretations. Keiretsu membership, size, and returns  32 
Table 8:  Keiretsu/non-Keiretsu Differentials, for Quintile 1-4 Firms, in Real IRRs and in Real 
Value Added by Industry, 1974-95 
This table shows the differences, keiretsu versus non-keiretsu, in real p.a.  IRR on value (Panel A), IRR on cost 
(Panel B), and Value Added (Panel C) per quintile (1  to 4)  and industry (1  to 9), 1974-95.  The IRRs on value 
and cost are modeled as in Table 7 (see ibid for  definitions and estimation procedure): 
9  4  9  4 
rv,;  = 2:)aV ,i + bv.iK;)Ii,; + L(ev., + fv"K;)S,,;  ,  r,,; = L(a',i + b"iK;)Ii.; + L(e", + f",K;)S"j' 
i=l  3=1  1=1 
Panel A:  Keiretsu/Non-keiretsu Differential in Real IRR on Value for  Quintile-s Firms by Industry 
b V •i + fv ... i  =  1, ... , 9, s =  1, ... ,4 
Quintile 4  Quintile 3  Quintile 2  Quintile 1 
Industry i  ,c,rv  t-test  ,c,rv  t-test  ,c,rv  t-test  ,c,rv  t-test 
1.  Construction  -0.18  -0.30  -0.70  -1.16  -0.81  -1.29  -0.10  -0.16 
2.  Food, Textile & Paper  0.59  1.19  0.07  0.15  -0.03  -0.07  0.67  1.18 
3.  (Petro)-Chern.  & Rubber  0.34  0.65  -0.18  -0.38  -0.29  -0.61  0.41  0.78 
4.  Glass, Steel &  Metal  1.18  2.66  0.66  1.52  0.55  1.21  1.25  2.66 
5.  Machine & Equipment  1.13  2.93  0.61  1.58  0.51  1.42  1.21  2.93 
6.  Wholesale &  Retail  2.35  3.65  1.83  2.92  1.72  2.58  2.42  3.20 
7.  Natural Res., Transp.  -0.22  -0.34  -0.74  -1.09  -0.85  -1.26  -0.15  -0.20 
8.  Real estate  1.50  1.59  0.98  1.00  0.87  0.90  1.57  1.56 
9.  Service  1.22  0.60  0.70  0.34  0.59  0.29  1.29  0.64 
Wald's X2(9),  (prob)  26.33  (0.00)  20.40  (0.02)  19.27  (0.02)  24.24  (0.00) 
Panel B:  Keiretsu/Non-keiretsu Differential in Real IRR on  Cost for  Quintile-s Firms by Industry 
bc,i+/c,s,i= l,,,.,9,s= 1, ... ,4 
Quintile 4  Quintile 3  Quintile 2  Quintile 1 
Industry i  ,c,r,  t-test  ,c,r,  t-test  ,c,r,  t-test  ,c,r,  t-test 
1.  Construction  0.36  0.51  -0.40  -0.51  -0.04  -0.05  1.36  1.69 
2.  Food, Textile & Paper  1.19  1.67  0.42  0.46  0.79  1.09  2.19  2.54 
3.  (Petro)-Chern.  & Rubber  0.22  0.38  -0.55  -0.90  -0.18  -0.33  1.22  1.79 
4.  Glass, Steel &  Metal  0.82  1.23  0.05  0.07  0.42  0.61  1.82  2.30 
5.  Machine & Equipment  0.63  1.24  -0.14  -0.26  0.23  0.49  1.63  2.52 
6.  Wholesale &  Retail  1.24  1.47  0.48  0.57  0.84  0.95  2.25  2.34 
7.  Natural Res., Transp.  0.04  0.05  -0.73  -0.86  -0.36  -0.47  1.04  1.16 
8.  Real estate  0.41  0.26  -0.35  -0.22  0.01  0.01  1.42  0.85 
9.  Service  -0.56  -0.29  -1.33  -0.66  -0.96  -0.49  0.44  0.22 
Wald's X2(9),  (prob)  5.62  (0.78)  4.12  (0.90)  3.88  (0.92)  10.63  (0.30) 
Panel C:  Keiretsu/Non-keiretsu Differential in Real Vale Added for Quintile-s Firms by Industry 
(b"i + f",) - (bv,i + fv"j, i = 1, ... ,9, s = 1, ... , 4 
Industry i 
1.  Construction 
2.  Food, Textile & Paper 
3.  (Petro)-Chem.  & Rubber 
4.  Glass, Steel &  Metal 
5.  Machine & Equipment 
6.  Wholesale & Retail 
7.  Natural Res., Transp. 
8.  Real estate 
9.  Service 
Wald's X2(9),  (prob) 
Quintile 4  Quintile 3  Quintile 2 
,c,r,  t-test  ,c,r,  t-test  ,c,r,  t-test 
0.54  0.97  0.30  0.49  0.77  1.39 
0.60  1.08  0.35  0.43  0.82  1.48 
-0.12  -0.30  -0.37  -0.82  0.11  0.31 
-0.36  -0.69  -0.61  -1.05  -0.13  -0.26 
-0.51  -1.28  -0.75 
-1.10  -1.64  -1.35 
0.26  0.63  0.01 
-1.08  -0.93  -1.33 
-1.78  -1.47  -2.02 




















,c,r,  t-test 
1.47  2.55 
1.52  2.35 
0.81  1.75 
0.57  0.94 
0.42  0.94 
-0.18  -0.26 
1.18  2.48 
-0.16  -0.13 
-0.85  -0.67 
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4.2  Interpretation 
For large firms, the picture is as follows:  keiretsu firms appear to have no statistically detectable 
cost-of-capital advantage over similar-sized non-keiretsu ones, but their return on investment 
is  unambiguously lower.  The lack of any beneficial  effect  in terms of agency  costs is  not 
necessarily surprising:  also non-keiretsu firms have house banks, and among large listed firms, 
information asymmetries or liquidity constraints must be rare in the first place.  The results on 
return on investment, however,  (where non-keiretsu returns are much higher) is open to more 
than one possible interpretation.  From our discussion of Table 1 in Section 2.2, the competing 
views can be regrouped as follows: 
(a)  in the static, neoclassical decreasing-returns view,  without liquidity constraints, a  high 
return on investment just follows  from  a  high  cost of capital; so  it is,  in itself, neither 
good nor bad; 
(b)  still within the same decreasing-returns view,  but with a capital-market failure,  a high 
return on investment reflects  underinvestment  caused by liquidity constraints,  so  it is 
bad; 
(c)  under the heterogeneous-firm, competitive-advantage view,  a high return on investment 
points to a less competitive industry or better management (including competitive edge, 
shareholder-value focus), so it is  good. 
The notion that the non-keiretsu-firms' higher return on investment mirrors a higher cost 
of capital-view (a), above-is not supported by the data.  We found that, across the board, 
required returns are not systematically higher for  keiretsu firms.  Looking at the individual 
numbers in Table 7.A, we  also see that non-keiretsu industries with higher required IRRs-on-
value do not have systematically higher IRRs-on-cost.  For instance, the slope of a quick OL8 
regression of rv on re across the nine industries turns out to have a value of only 0.16, which is 
insignificantly above zero (p=0.70) and significantly below unity (p=0.07); and the adjusted 
R2  of that regression is even negative. 
Might  the higher  reS  among large  non-keiretsu  firms  reflect  underinvestment  caused by 
liquidity constraints, view (b)?  After looking at smaller-firm results, we  can reject this notion 
by contradiction, as follows.  If  it would be true that even large non-keiretsu firms have trouble 
raising  funds,  then smaller  non-keiretsu should have even  more  problems in this field  and 
thus,  in this view,  have even  higher reS.  However,  smaller  non-keiretsu firrns  in the same Keiretsu membership, size, and returns  34 
industry turn out to have lower reS than large non-keiretsu ones, which does not conform to 
the liquidity-constraint/underinvestment view.  This then leaves us with the third view,  (c): 
large keiretsu firms were, generally speaking, less professionally run or they happened to be in 
more competitive sectors.  The sluggish-management interpretation, in turn, may have been 
the result of a less Darwinian environment for  keiretsu sarari men, or it may have been the 
result of deliberate cross-subsidized overinvestment in large firms,  under political or employee 
pressure.  Let us see which of these views best fits the numbers. 
The hypothesis that the large keiretsu-firms' low returns on investment reflect a lower mar-
ket power is  unconvincing.  We already correct for  industry and size effects, which eliminates 
one  possible explanation relative to non-keiretsu firms.  Also,  if even large keiretsu firms sin-
gularly lack market power,  then smaller players should do even worse  in this respect.  Yet, 
smaller keiretsu firms obtain better returns on investments than large ones.  Thus, the poor 
returns to large keiretsu firms  probably have  little to do with differential market  power.14 
This leaves us with two remaining views:  a less capable management, and/or cross-subsidized 
overinvestment. 
Are there any traces of cross-subsidizing in our tables? Funneling cash from smaller firms 
to large ones,  if it did take place,  could have occurred via two channels:  either by transfer 
pricing via the soga sosha (the group's reinvoicing center), or by hold-up behavior from banks 
towards smaller firms to the benefit of the larger group members.  There is  no  statistically 
clear evidence of transfer pricing among keiretsu firms.  Indeed, if  operating-profit reallocation 
did occur on a large scale, then small keiretsu firms should look less profitable than similar-
sized non-keiretsu ones in the same industry.  Yet  we do not observe this:  the re-differences 
are,  generally speaking, insignificant, and the (weak) evidence for  differential performance is 
actually in favor of the keiretsu firms rather than against them (as one would have expected 
if there were  systematic transfer pricing).  Thus, cross-subsidization,  if any,  would  have  to 
be through the banking system and show up in the cost of capital, rv.  We  do  see,  indeed, 
that smaller keiretsu firins have higher estimated rvs than larger ones.  This, of course, could 
still  be the inevitable result of size-related information asymmetry, one that even the most 
benevolent bank cannot cure.  More tellingly, however, smaller keiretsu firms  also have higher 
rvs than non-keiretsu firms of the same industry and size.  Thus, keiretsu membership does not 
!'In our terminology, market power is purely size-related, and successfull product differentiation is part of the 
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seem to provide the beneficial effects that some predict. Rather, our verdict tends towards the 
holdup-behavior hypothesis-albeit a selective variant, where stealing is from the small so  as 
to subsidize the large-possibly combined with a less nimble management. 
We conclude,  in the next section, by linking the above statistical analysis to some of the 
qualitative findings, from Section 3.1, on capital structure. 
5  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we estimate the IRRs on value and cost for the Japanese non-financials for 1974-
95, using a methodology that allows expected returns to vary across industries, size classes, and 
governance systems. Like Fama and French (1999), who apply a similar yardstick to U.S. data, 
we find that Japan's non-financials firms have added value.  We can also confirm that this is a 
statistically significant and pervasive phenomenon, holding irrespective of industry, size,  and 
governance system.  The main issue of the paper is,  however, how keiretsu membership affects 
the components of Value Added:  the required return on value and the return on cost.  As far 
as cost of capital is  concerned, we find  no evidence whatsoever that keiretsu firms  enjoy an 
advantage relative to comparable non-keiretsu ones.  To the contrary, for  medium- and small-
sized firms the finding is that keiretsu firms often suffer from a higher required return. In terms 
of return on investment, we  find  that top-league keiretsu firms  experienced definitely poorer 
payoffs than did comparable non-keiretsu ones;  for  medium- to small-sized firms  there is  no 
clear difference.  The resulting effect of keiretsu membership on Value Added was pervasively 
negative for large firms,  and rather unclear for medium- and small-sized ones. 
The findings regarding the cost of capital do not support the traditional perception that 
keiretsu firms  have  an edge  in that respect.  So  lower  agency costs do  not seem to be the 
reason why they borrow more (as we  noted in Section 3.2).  Rather, their higher leverage is 
more likely to be the reflection of co-insurance and size-larger firms, benefitting from internal 
diversification,  can (and do)  borrow more-or a  way  of supporting overinvestment,  rather 
than mainly a  rational response to lower  agency costs.  Possible  explanations why there is 
no noticeable cost-of-capital advantage are that also non-keiretsu firms  tend to have  a  main 
bank, and that there may be few important information asymmetries anyway about firms that, 
being listed, are never really small in the first place.  In short, for  many firms the advantages 
of keiretsu membership may be less important than they are often cracked  up to be or may 
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While these arguments may explain the absence of a cost-of-capital advantage for affiliated 
firms, they fail to explain why significant differences in the required return always correspond 
to a  keiretsu  disadvantage rather than the other way  around.  For  an explanation of that 
phenomenon,  we  have  to fall  back  on a  somewhat heterodox  view  in the literature:  some 
keiretsu firms,  being captive customers of the group's bank, are being overcharged.  There is 
support for this hold-up-behavior hypothesis in our data:  higher costs of capital are observed 
only for smaller firms, which have fewer or no alternative sources of financing.  The selectiveness 
of banks' holdup tactics could  also  help explain why  large keiretsu firms,  not being at the 
paying end of the scheme, borrowed relatively more even though their investments were smaller 
(relative to asets) and less profitable. 
A frequently-advanced potential advantage of keiretsu membership is that intra-group fi-
nancial flows  reduce liquidity constraints on investments, thus allowing higher growth.  Our 
finding, in Section 3.2, that non-keiretsu firms actually invested more than did keiretsu mem-
bers does not necessarily contradict this proposition:  keiretsu firms  are typically larger and 
tend to be in mature industries, so that their opportunities for profitable investment may have 
been relatively less abundant. One advantage of our analysis of returns on cost is that it does 
provide information on profitability after controlling for  size  and industry factors.  We find 
that, among large firms of a given industry, keiretsu members tend to register lower  returns 
on cost.  After ruling out other explanations, one likely cause of these low returns is that large 
keiretsu-firms had too easy access to funds.  Our results on financing  policies point into the 
same direction:  relative to non-keiretsu firms, keiretsu members may have over-borrowed and 
-invested.  Indeed, as of 1985  and especially 1990,  both classes of firms  have cut down their 
investments, and have also departed from the traditional pecking order, relying relatively more 
on new equity.  At the same time, however, keiretsu members have actually been withdrawing 
short-term debt, which suggests that their financial health was worse than that of non-keiretsu 
firms  (who expanded their short term borrowing). 
Financial keiretsu groups (or the zaibatsu out of which many keiretsu grew) may have been 
economically  useful in the days when capital markets were  primitive and  highly imperfect. 
There still  are traces of such a  beneficial role:  some  of the smallest keiretsu firms  seem to 
have flourished in their investments despite their high cost of capital.  But otherwise, keiretsu 
groups seem to have outlived their erstwhile economic usefulness. Keiretsu membership, size, and returns  37 
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